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"STRIKE SENIORITY" POLICY: UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
OR LEGITIMATE BUSINESS DEVICE?
T HE -EVER-INCREASING POWER of modern industrial and trade unions
has led to a correlative desire on the part of management to' devise
new means for exerting economic pressure upon striking workers.
Illustrative of those innovations is the "strike seniority" policy which
is characterized by an employer's offer of seniority rights to strike
replacements, as well as to those workers who have either abandoned
or not participated in an economic strike." Upon termination of the
strike, reinstated strikers, if any, are then subordinated in seniority
to the replacements, and, in the event of a lay-off, are the first employees
to be discharged. A question then arises as to whether the institution of
such a policy is an unfair labor practice in violation of § 8(a) (3) of the
National Labor Relations Act,2 which forbids an employer "by discrim-
ination in regard to hire and tenure of employment ... to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization. .. 2
In Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. NLRB, the employer, subse-
quent to the termination of an economic strike, altered its seniority policy
so as to subordinate the rights of returning strikers to those of the
workers who had remained on the job or had returned to work during
the course of the strike. Thereafter, seven employees were laid off in
accordance with the superseniority policy although none could have been
removed if their pre-strike seniority rights had been retained. The .dis-
' The cases dealing with the problems of reinstatement or discharge of strikers draw
a fundamental distinction between "economic" and "unfair labor practice" strikes, a
distinction which stems from the language of § 2(3) of the National Labor Relations
Act. This section provides: "The term 'employee' ... shall include any individual whose
work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or
because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and
substantially equivalent employment .... " (emphasis added.) 49 STAT. 450 (1935), 29
U.S.C. § 152(3) (1952). The term "current labor dispute" is synonomous with
"economic strike" and includes any controversy concerning wages, hours and other
employment benefits, as distinguished from the "unfair labor practice strike" which is
precipitated by alleged violations by an employer of § 8(a) of the act. The true sig-
nificance of this distinction is pointed up by the decision of the Supreme Court in NLRB
v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (938). See note so infra. See
also NLRB v. A. Sartorius & Co., 14o F.2d 203, 2o6 (2d Cir. 1944).
249 STAT. 452 (193S), 29 U.S.C. § 58(a) (3) (1952).
S232 F.zd 158 ( 4 th Cir. 1956), cert. granted, 352 U.S. 819 (1956) 42 VA. L.
REV. 836 (s956).
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missed employees, through their union representative, filed a complaint
with the NLRB alleging that the employer's conduct, in instituting the
new seniority system and discharging workers pursuant to that policy,
constituted discriminatory conduct of a nature prohibited by Section
8(a) (3) of the NLRA.4  Finding that the employer was thus engaging
in an unfair labor practice, the NLRB issued a cease and desist order
and ordered reinstatement of the discharged workers with their former
seniority rights. On the employer's petition to have the order set aside,
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, one judge dissenting, de-
creed enforcement of the Board's order.6
In reaching its decision, the court was forced to distinguish NLRB v.
Potlatch Forests; Inc., in which the Ninth Circuit held that a strike
seniority policy which was "advocated ... before the strike was settled,
adopted.., at the time of settlement and.., consistently maintained...
at all times thereafter" 8 (emphasis added) was not a discriminatory prac-
tice if adopted for the purpose of protecting and continuing the employ-
er's business during the course of an economic strike. The Supreme Court
had ruled several years earlier in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph
Co.9 that an employer not only could replace striking workers in order
to protect his business enterprise but also could offer permanent tenure
to replacements as an inducement to accept the positions vacated by the
'The Supreme Court in the leading case of Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.
177 (x94 i), held that the discharge of an employee because of participation in strike
activities was discrimination within the meaning of § 8 (a) (3). Similarly, the Seventh
Circuit in Polish National di1liance v. NLRB, 136 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1943), ruled that
the reinstatement of a striker must be unconditional. And see, Republic Steel Corp. .
NLRB, 114 F.2d 820, 821 (3rd Cir. 1940), in which the court said: "We think it was
the intention of the Board ... to provide that upon reinstatement the striking employees
were to be treated in all matters involving seniority and continuity of employment as
though they had not been absent from work. It follows that the reinstated strikers
are entitled to the benefits of Republic's vacation plan for the year in which they are
reinstated and all subsequent years upon a basis of continuity of service computed as
though they had been actually at work during the entire period [of the strike]. .... 1
'232 F.2d at x62. Circuit Judge Soper dissented on the ground that the majority
holding was in "direct conflict" with the decision of the Ninth Circuit in NLRB V.
Potlatch Forests, Inc., 189 F.2d 82 ( 9 th Cir. 195!). See note ii infra.
'In addition to a violation of § 8(a) (3) the court found that "Olin's superseniority
policy is in conflict with Section 13 of the Act, providing that 'Nothing in this Act, ex-
cept as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with
or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike. . . '. [49 STAT. 457 (x935), a9
U.S.C. § 163 (1952)]. 232 F.2d at 16o. Incidental to the holding on the question of
the employer's strike seniority policy, the NLRB and the Fourth Circuit found that the
company had refused to bargain collectively as required by §§ 8(a) (5) and (1) of the
NLRA. 232 F.2d at x62.
189 F.2d 82 (gth Cir. x95s).
x 189 F.2d at 86.
'3o4. U.S. 333 (1938).
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strikers.' -The Fourth Circuit recognized Potlatch as a logical extension
of the Mackay doctrine on the ground that since a granting of permanent
tenure would preclude even the reinstatement of a replaced striker in his
pre-strike position, an additional offer of seniority privileges would seem
to impose no further hardship upon the striking employee. In Olin
Mathieson, however, the strike seniority policy was not instituted in
order to induce strikers and/or new workers to cross the picket line to
keep the plant in operation. Rather, the alteration of seniority status
occurred after the strike had terminated, motivated, as the court found,
by a desire to penalize the reinstated strikers." Thus, the promise of
"0 "Nor was it an unfair labor practice to replace the striking employees with others
in an effort to carry on the business. Although § 13 . .. provides, 'Nothing in this Act
shall be construed so as to interfere with our impede or diminish in any way the right
to strike,' it does not follow that an employer, guilty of no act denounced by the sfatute,
has lost the right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left vacant by
strikers. And he is not bound to discharge those hired to fill the places of strikers, upon
the election of the latter to resume their employment, in order to create places for them.
The assurance by respondent [Mackay] to those who accepted employment during the
strike that if they so desired their places might be permanent was not an unfair labor
practice nor was it such to reinstate only so many of the strikers as there were vacant
places to be filled." NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304. U.S. 333, 34-5(1938). The Mackay doctrine is limited to what the Court termed a "current labor
dispute" (304 U.S. at 344) which is the equivalent of the more commonly used phrase
"economic strike." In addition, the words "guilty of no act denounced by the statute,"
as employed by the Court in the excerpt from its opinion set forth above, indicate that
the permissibility of securing permanent replacements does not extend to situations in-
volving "unfair labor practice" strikes within the meaning of the statute.
It should be noted that the Court's decision raises the question as to whether an offer
of permanent tenure must be limited to those situations in which replacements would
otherwise be unwilling to accept positions. For, in the Mackay case itself, the replace-
ments were secured from other offices of the employer, and it was not clearly shown that
the offer of tenure was put forward as an inducement to replacements. 304 U.S. at 338.
" "But the situation before us is quite different. The strike was over, the strikers
had returned to work. . . . Olin, after the strike, when there was no necessity for such'
action to keep its plant in operation, promulgated its superseniority policy in favor of
the so-called 'loyal employees' and against those who returned to work after the strike
had failed and was over. Olin was clearly penalizing the strikers for exercising their
right to strike and was thereby dearly discouraging any exercise of this right in the
future.' 232 F.2d at i6x. Cf. NLRB v. Sandy Hill Iron & Brass Works, x65 F.2d 66o(2d Cir. 1947), in which the employer was found to have discriminated against re-
turning strikers by instituting a strike seniority policy. In that case, the court reached
its decision on the basis of evidence tending to show that the employer had made several -
anti-union statements, thus manifesting a -discriminatory motive for his conduct.
While there can be little doubt as to the validity of the result reached by the Fourth
Circuit in Olin Mathieson, an examination of the facts in the Potlatch case, supra note 7,
reveals an almost indistinguishable situation, thus lending support to the conclusion ex-
pressed by Judge Soper in dissent. See note 5 supra. In the latter case, the strike
terminated on October 13, 1947 and the strike seniority policy was imposed on October
14. Seniority was not offered as an inducement to replacements. Rather, the employer's
.plan was adopted after the strike had ended, just as was done by the'employer in Olin
Math)eson. Consequently, commentators, in their discussion of the Potlatch holding, were
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seniority to non-strikers constituted an unlawful discrimination against
those employees who had exercised their statutory right to strike.
The Fourth Circuit in the Olin Mathieson decision implies that
where replacements, necessary for the preservation of a business, can be
obtained only by an offer of seniority over returning strikers, and are so
obtained, the institution of a strike seniority policy is justified.12 Un-
fortunately, the facility with which the court was able to distinguish the
Potlatch decision and, thus, find the commission of an unfair labor prac-
tice in Olin Mathieson renders unnecessary a judicial determination of
the validity of a strike seniority policy per se. An analysis of this broader
problem, however, suggests that such a policy, regardless of the time
when instituted, would be discriminatory in nature.
Since a 'striking worker, during the course of a strike, retains his
identity as an "employee" within the meaning of the NLRA,3 he is still
entitled to those protections which the act affords. 4 Thus, until such
time as the dispute is settled, an employee who participates in a strike
prone to treat the decision unfavorably, employing reasoning similar to that of the
Fourth Circuit in the instant case. See Notes, 4 STAN. L. REV. 151 (195 1); 100 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 287 (ig5); 6 RUTGERS L. REV. 470 (952); 30 TEXAs L. REV. 776
(95z) ; 9 WASH. & LEE L. REV. -15 (1952).
The soundness of the Potlatch decision is open to question on another ground. Com-
pare the statement of the Ninth Circuit that "the 'discrimination' between replacements
and strikers is not an unfair labor practice despite a tendency to discourage union
actioities. . . ." (i89 F.zd at 86) (emphasis added) with the words of the Supreme
Court: "Thus an employer's protestation that he did not intend to encourage or dis-
courage must be unavailing where a natural consequence of his action was such en-
couragement or discouragement." Radio Officers' Union of Commercial Telegrapher
Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 45 (5954) '(emphasis added.)
"Olin, after .the strike, when there was no necessity for such action to keep
its plant in operation, promulgated its superseniority policy. . . ." 232 F.zd at 161
(emphasis added.) Clearly, the implication here is that a strike seniority policy would
have been viewed as valid by the court had the employer offered the seniority privileges
as an inducement to replacements.
1" The statutory definition as found in § 2(3) of the act is set forth in note i supra.
' These protections are stated in the form of negative prohibitions against certain
conduct by employers and are found in § 8(a) of the NLRA.
"Section 8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(i) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7;
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor or-
ganization or contribute financial or other support to it, ....
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organiza-
tion.....
(4) to dischaige or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has
filed charges or given testimony under this Act;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees .
49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952).
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cannot be discriminated against "in regard to hire and tenure of employ-
ment"i and the Olin Mathieson decision makes it equally dear that the
striker who returns to his job following the settlement of the strike
cannot be treated unfairly.'5 While, upon superficial examination, the
decision of the Supreme Court in the Mackay case would seem to declare
an exception to this rule by permitting a striking worker to be perma-
nently replaced, the termination of a strike strips the replaced striker of
his "employee" characteristics and, thus, abrogates his standing to *claim
statutory protection from the type of discriminatory discharge allegedly
practiced by the employer in refusing to reinstate him. 6 On the other
hand, the reinstated striker who has constantly maintained his "em-
ployee" status cannot be deprived of those benefits which had accrued to
him prior to the calling of the strike. Rather, upon resuming his duties,
he is entitled to be restored to his former position with all its attendant
privileges.' 7 For, to grant seniority rights to a newly hired strike
replacement or a non-striking worker at the expense of a striking em-
ployee who returns to his job is to afford benefits to certain employees
solely on the basis of their refusal to join in a strike and, at the same
time, to deprive other employees of these same benefits solely on the
basis of their willingness to participate in a strike." Clearly, such a
a' See note xi supra.
,o It is this rationale which underlies the decision in the Mackay case, notes 9 and to
supra.
"7 If a striker has not been replaced within the permissible limits of the Mackay case,
supra note 9, he is entitled to reinstatement. Home Beneficial Life Insurance Co. v.
NLRB, 159 F.2d 28o (4 th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, '332 U.S. 758 (1947)i NLRB v.
Poultrymen's Service Corp., 138 F.2d 204, 211 (3rd Cir' 1943) ; Firth Carpet Co. v.
NLRB, sag F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1942). And such reinstatement must be uncon-
ditional. Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 136 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1943); Republic
Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 820 (3rd Cir. 1940); NLRB v. Star Publishing Co., 7
F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1938) (These thre6 cases were distinguished in Potlatch, supra note
7, on the ground that they involved unfair labor practice strikes as opposed to economiE
strikes); J & H Clasgens Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 898 (1944) ; Indiana Desk Co., 56 N.L.R.B.
76 (x944) i St. Marys Sewer Pipe Co., 54 N.L.R.B. 1226 (1944) ; Wallingford Steel
Co., 53 N.L.R.B. 404 (1943); Republic Creosoting Co., ig N.L.R.B. 267 (940).
But cf. Wilson & Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 12o F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1941), in which an
employer's offer of conditional reinstatement was upheld since the activities of the
striking employees were unlawful and, therefore, deprived them of their statutory pro-
tection.
" The National Labor Relations Board has announced its view toward strike seniority
plans such as that initiated in Olin Mdthieson. In its-handling of the Potlatch case,
supra note 7, prior to its being appealed to the Ninth Circuit, the Board said as follows:
"The aspect of the 'Return-to-Work Policy' most pertinent here is the division of the
Respondent's employees, for purposes of determining seniority upon a reduction in force,
into two classes-one, composed of those who had crossed the Union's picket line during
the strike; the other, made up of those who remained out on strike during its entire
course. Employees in the first class were granted the benefit of a form of superseniority
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practice is discriminatory to the extent that it penalizes an employee for
availing himself of his right to strike as'guaranteed by Section 7 of the
NLRA.19
Moreover, it has been suggested that this conclusion as to the in-
validity of a strike seniority policy is equally applicable to any situation
in which an employer subordinates "continuous service credits" of
striking employees in deference to the credits of non-strikers or replace-
ments. Thus, a denial of an accrual of vacation and pension benefits to
the striker, while permitting an accrual of these same benefits to the non-
striker, would, by analogy to the strike seniority scheme, constitute an
unfair labor practice.2" In short, an employer has but two alternatives.
First, he may secure a permanent replacement for the worker who has
elected to participate in the strike; or, second, he may restore the striker
to his former position with his pre-strike status in relation to other em-
ployees. For, any other course of action would be tantamount to a
classification of employees predicated upon their participation in strike
activities.
-later styled by the Respondent as 'strike seniority.' Employees in the second class
suffered, concomitantly, an impairment of their'prestrike relative job retention rights....
"[W]here, as in this case, places are in fact available for the returning strikers,
and they are actually restored to their former jobs at the termination of the strike, the
Mackay Radio doctrine cannot be construed to justify as nondiscriminatory their 'partial
reinstatement' ....
"There can be no doubt.., that a seniority policy which classifies employees accord-
ing to whether they had worked during a strike, or had not, to the detriment of the
relative seniority standings of those who had not, discriminatorily and illegally impairs
the employment relationship of those who had exercised their right under the Act to
engage in concerted activities." Potlatch Forests, Inc., 87 N.L.R.B. 1193, 12o, 1209,
1210 (949). See also, Precision Castings Co., Inc. 48 N.L.R.B. 870, 879 (1943);
Paper, Calmenson and Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 553, 557 (194o) (dictum).
"' This section of the act provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organiza-
tion, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ... " 49 STAT.
452 (935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).
so "I would go further and find that the tolling of the continuous service credits
of the striking employees with respect to the accrual of vacation and pension benefits
likewise constituted discrimination violative of the Act." General Electric Co., go
N.L.R.B. 510, 514 (1948) (Member Murdock, dissenting in part).
The majority of the Board in the General Electric case asserted that "while it is
true that non-strikers were compensated by the accrual of vacation and retirement bene-
fits, as well as by money wages, for the period of the strike even though they did no
actual work, we do not regard this as discriminatory against the strikers" (emphasis
added.) So N.L.R.B. at 511-513. However, both Mr. Murdock and the majority of
the members agreed, as to the employer's strike seniority plan, that "except to the
extent that a striker may be replaced during an economic strike, his employment re-
lationship cannot otherwise be severed or impaired because of his strike activity." 8o
N;L1R U. at 5i 3.
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Furthermore, an extension of the Mackay doctrine to permit an offer-
ing of seniority rights and other benefits as an inducement to strike re-
placements would virtually nullify the effectiveness of the strike as a
collective bargaining device." For, an inducement to replacements
which includes promises not only of permanent job security but also of
employment benefits superior to those enjoyed by other employees would
require a proportionate increase in union strength to offset the increased
incentive to outsiders.2" Thus, the economic strike is rendered obviously
less effective as a means of exerting pressure on management unless strike
replacements are either unavailable, or, being available, are dissuaded
from accepting the employer's offer because of the relative power of the
striking labor organization.
Accordingly, any inducement to replacements which would afford
them employment benefits superior to those of reinstated strikers is not
only violative of Section 8(a) (3) of the NLRA but also fails of support
from a policy standpoint to the extent that public policy demands the
preservation of the economic strike in the collectiye bargaining process.
Therefore, the institution of a "strike seniority" plan must be viewed as
an unwarranted extension of the Mackay doctrine-a device which could
readily destroy the balance of power in labor-management relations.
" An employee would be highly reluctant to relinquish his position temporarily,
knowing that, even should his job be available following settlement of the strike, he
would be one of the first to be released in the event of a lay-off. Admittedly, this same
element of strike deterrence is inherent in the granting of permanent tenure to replace-
ments, as approved in the Mackay case (supra note 9), and yet two practical considera-
tions suggests that deterrent factors are present there in a 1hsser degree than in an offer
of seniority. For, an employee might be willing to incur the risk of losing his job
if he knows that there is a possibility that someone other than himself could easily be
the one replaced; in contrast, the same employee would hesitate before joining in a strike
if he knew that, in addition to the possible loss of his job, his assured status-upon re-
instatement would be comparatively worthless because of seniority rights.
One writer, however, has suggested that a strike seniority policy would have no
deterrent effect upon strike participation since the possible loss of jobs under Mackay
is "a far graver risk than loss of seniority." Note, ioo U. OF PA. L. REV. 287, 289
('9s). If the loss of job and the loss of seniority are viewed independently, this
assertion is obviously correct. Yet an offer to replacements of seniority must necessarily
be coupled with an offer of permanent tenure, since, absent the latter offer, the striking
employee is entitled to reinstatment. (See cases cited in note 17, supra.) It is this
double-barreled offer which increases the degree of strike deterrence.
'"See Note, 4 STAN. L. REv. 151, (95*1)-
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